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The  outbreak  of  Middle  East  respiratory  syndrome  coronavirus  (MERS-CoV)  has  caused  209 deaths  and
699  laboratory-conﬁrmed  cases  in  the  Arabian  Peninsula  as of  June  11,  2014.  Preparedness  efforts  are
hampered  by  considerable  uncertainty  about  the  nature  and  intensity  of human-to-human  transmission,
with  previous  reproduction  number  estimates  ranging  from  0.4  to  1.5. Here  we  synthesize  epidemiolog-
ical  data  and  transmission  models  for the MERS-CoV  outbreak  during  April–October  2013  to  resolve
uncertainties  in  epidemic  risk,  while  considering  the  impact  of  observation  bias. We  match  the  progres-
sion  of MERS-CoV  cases  in 2013  to a  dynamic  transmission  model  that  incorporates  community  and
hospital  compartments,  and  distinguishes  transmission  by  zoonotic  (index)  cases  and  secondary  cases.
When  observation  bias  is assumed  to  account  for  the fact  that all reported  zoonotic  cases  are  severe,  but
only ∼57%  of  secondary  cases  are  symptomatic,  the average  reproduction  number  of MERS-CoV  is  esti-
mated  to  be 0.45  (95%  CI:0.29–0.61).  Alternatively,  if these  epidemiological  observations  are  taken  at  face
value,  index  cases  are  estimated  to  transmit  substantially  more  effectively  than  secondary  cases,  (Ri =  0.84
(0.58-1.20)  vs  Rs = 0.36  (0.24–0.51)).  In  both  scenarios  the  relative  contribution  of  hospital-based  trans-
mission  is  over  four  times  higher  than  that of  community  transmission,  indicating  that  disease  control
should  be  focused  on  hospitalized  patients.
Adjusting  previously  published  estimates  for observation  bias  conﬁrms  a strong  support  for  the  average
R <  1 in the  ﬁrst  stage  of  the  outbreak  in 2013  and  thus,  transmissibility  of  secondary  cases  of MERS-CoV
remained  well  below  the  epidemic  threshold.  More  information  on  the  observation  process  is needed
to  clarify  whether  MERS-CoV  is intrinsically  weakly  transmissible  between  people  or whether  existing
control  measures  have  contributed  meaningfully  to reducing  the  transmissibility  of  secondary  cases.  Our
results could  help  evaluate  the  progression  of  MERS-CoV  in  recent  months  in response  to changes  in
disease  surveillance,  control  interventions,  or viral  adaptation.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-NDntroduction
An outbreak of novel Middle East respiratory syndrome coro-
avirus (MERS-CoV) is ongoing in the Arabian Peninsula, with the
rst case identiﬁed in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in June 2012 (Zaki et al.,
012). Phylogenetic analyses have indicated that the novel virus
merged in July 2011, with broad uncertainty range, and that the
∗ Corresponding author at: Arizona State University, PO Box 872402, Tempe, AZ
5287-2402, USA. Tel.: +1 480 965 4730.
E-mail addresses: gchowell@asu.edu, gchowell82@gmaill.com (G. Chowell).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.epidem.2014.09.011
755-4365/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article unlicense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
outbreak results from multiple introductions of a weakly transmis-
sible virus that is geographically dispersed (Cotten et al., 2013). A
total of 699 laboratory-conﬁrmed cases of infection with MERS-
CoV, including 209 deaths, have been reported as of June 11, 2014
(The World Health Organization, 2014). Sporadic cases have been
imported to Europe, Africa, Asia and North America via returning
travelers from the Middle East, but no sustained transmission has
been reported in those regions.Sporadic introductions of MERS-CoV into humans are suspected
to involve bats (Ithete et al., 2013) and/or camels (Reusken et al.,
2013; Haagmans et al., 2014) with camels implicated as the likely
source of most zoonotic infections of MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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Alagaili et al., 2014). Meanwhile, there is considerable uncer-
ainty about the extent of human-to-human transmission and it is
nclear whether MERS-CoV has the potential for epidemic spread.
ransmission appears limited among family members but may
e ampliﬁed in health care settings (Cotten et al., 2013; Breban
t al., 2013). An understanding of the MERS-CoV epidemiology
nd transmission pathways are critically needed to devise effective
urveillance, prevention and control strategies.
The reproduction number, R, which measures the average num-
er of secondary cases from each infected person, is a useful metric
or assessing the transmission potential of an emerging pathogen
uch as MERS-CoV (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2009; Wolfe et al., 2007). If
 < 1 then infections occur in isolated clusters as self-limited chains
f transmission, and persistence of the disease requires contin-
ed animal-to-human infections (Anderson and May, 1991). When
veraged over all reported cases, two recent studies have estimated
n overall R (denoted Roverall) to be in a range of 0.42–0.92 (Breban
t al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014), thus diminishing the concern
f MERS-CoV epidemic spread. In contrast, when R is evaluated for
ust the index cases originating from animal-to-human transmis-
ion, estimates (denoted Ri) can be as high as 1.5 (Cauchemez et al.,
014), suggesting that epidemic spread is possible.
In order to implement effective surveillance and control meas-
res, it is important to understand the reason for the difference in
nferred values of Roverall and Ri. One possibility is that secondary
human-to-human) cases transmit less than index cases, either
ecause of intrinsic biological differences, or because of less effec-
ive control measures for index cases relative to secondary cases. A
econd possibility is that the transmission potential of index and
econdary cases is similar, but many weakly transmitting index
ases are unobserved. The tendency to identify and report larger
lusters (whose index case cause a higher than average number of
ew cases) would lead to an overestimation of Ri (Ferguson et al.,
004; Blumberg and Lloyd-Smith, 2013a,b; Farrington et al., 2003;
imoin et al., 2010). It is important to evaluate both possibilities,
ecause the optimal utilization of public health resources depends
n the relative transmission potential of primary and secondary
ases.
To gain perspective on the troublesome wide range of R esti-
ates straddling the epidemic threshold of 1 associated with the
013 outbreak of MERS-CoV, we develop a stochastic transmis-
ion model that distinguishes the transmission of index cases from
econdary cases and incorporates different reporting scenarios for
ndex cases. In order to relate case observation to disease severity
e also distinguish cases that are sick enough to become hospi-
alized from those who are treated entirely in the community. We
se a Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo estimation technique to match
ur model with observed MERS-CoV 2013 case data, provide esti-
ates of the reproduction number, and revisit earlier estimates
Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014) through the lens of
eporting bias. Finally, we highlight residual data gaps that would
e particularly useful to clarify the transmission process in 2014
nd beyond.
aterials and methods
ata sources
Our analysis focuses on the progression of the MERS-CoV out-
reak in April–October 2013, a period when pro-active surveillance
as in place in Saudi Arabia (Memish et al., 2014), the country
here most cases have been reported thus far. The beginning of our
tudy period coincides with the onset of a large hospital outbreak
n April 8, 2013 (Assiri et al., 2013a), which prompted an increase in
he incidence of MERS-CoV case reports in the country (Cauchemezics 9 (2014) 40–51 41
et al., 2014; Penttinen et al., 2013), resulting in a steady case detec-
tion rate (Memish et al., 2014) and a balanced male-female ratio.
Our study period ends in October 2013 so that our estimates can
be compared with earlier studies focused on the early phase of the
MERS-CoV outbreak (Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014);
in particular we do not consider the resurgence of cases reported
in Spring 2014 (The World Health Organization, 2014).
We analyzed a line list of laboratory-conﬁrmed and probable
MERS-CoV cases from various sources including WHO  bulletins and
media reports, obtained through passive epidemiological surveil-
lance and case contact tracing (Rambaut, 2013). For each of the
122 cases with symptoms reported during April 8 and October
31, 2013, we  obtained the dates of symptom onset and hospital
admission, reporting date, disease severity (asymptomatic, mild,
and severe) and transmission category (i.e., index case, secondary
case, as assessed by health authorities) (Rambaut, 2013).
MERS-CoV index cases were those with no identiﬁed exposure
to other cases prior to disease onset and were considered to be
zoonotic cases (i.e. arising from animal-to-human transmission).
We also distinguished between transmission occurring in the hos-
pital and in the community, based on surveillance reports.
Asymptomatic cases were deﬁned as patients who  did not
exhibit symptoms but had laboratory conﬁrmation of MERS-CoV
infection (World Health Organization, 2013) while severe cases
included all hospitalized cases, with possible admission to intensive
care unit.
Epidemiological scenarios
To reﬂect uncertainty in the observation process of MERS-
CoV cases, we considered two  epidemiological scenarios. In a
‘surveillance bias’ scenario (scenario A), we assume that index and
secondary cases have similar transmission properties, but only the
hospitalized index cases are detected (Fig. 1). This scenario assumes
the reason all observed index cases required hospitalization is
that the observation process is ﬂawed and can only detect severe
index cases. In a ‘differential-transmission’ scenario (scenario B),
we assume that all index cases develop severe disease, require hos-
pitalization, and thus contribute more to the overall transmission
process than a typical secondary case (Cauchemez et al., 2014).
In both scenarios, secondary cases can either be asymptomatic,
mild or severe and thus have zero, weak or strong transmissibility,
respectively.
Stochastic SEIR transmission model
We employed a stochastic SEIR-type compartmental transmis-
sion model (e.g., Anderson and May, 1991; Chowell et al., 2003;
Riley et al., 2003; Lipsitch et al., 2003; Diekmann and Heesterbeek,
2000; Gumel et al., 2004) that incorporates key epidemiological
features of the MERS-CoV outbreak (WHO  MERS, 2013), includ-
ing zoonotic transmission from an unspeciﬁed animal reservoir,
and human-to-human transmission in the community and hospi-
tal (Fig. 1, Text S1). The model is stochastic, which is particularly
important to consider when overall disease incidence is low. In our
main analysis, we  ﬁt the model to observed outbreak size data at
the end of the study period in each of the 3 transmission settings
(reservoir, community, hospital), and run sensitivity analyses by
trajectory matching the daily progression of cumulative cases.
In this model, the population is divided into 9 categories
(Fig. 1): Susceptible individuals (S); Individuals exposed to the
zoonotic reservoir (Ei) or to infectious humans (Es), Infectious and
symptomatic individuals arising from reservoir (Ii), or from human-
to-human transmission (Is); Asymptomatic and non-infectious
individuals arising from environmental/animal exposure (Ai) or
arising from human-to-human transmission (As); hospitalized
42 G. Chowell et al. / Epidemics 9 (2014) 40–51
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the transition of cases (indicated by arrows) among the different epidemiological states in our model (Text S1).
Under ‘surveillance bias’ scenario A, index (zoonotic) and secondary cases follow a similar epidemiological progression (full model).
Under ‘transmission bias’ scenario B, index and secondary cases follow a different epidemiological progression: all index cases are symptomatic, develop severe disease, and
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e  assume that only the symptomatic cases are observed. The description and corr
ndividuals (H); and removed individuals after recovery or disease-
nduced death (R). The total population size (N) of Saudi Arabia is
29 million and assumed to be initially completely susceptible, in
ine with serosurveys (Tefanie Gierer et al., 2013; Aburizaiza et al.,
013).
The system of nonlinear differential equations that describe
he full transmission model is given in supporting Text S1. Sus-
eptible individuals are infected uniformly at random from the
oonotic reservoir at rate ˛, generating index cases· Susceptible
ndividuals infected through contact with infectious individuals
secondary cases) enter the latent period at rate ˇ(Ii + Is + lH)/N
here  ˇ is the mean human-to-human transmission rate per day
nd l quantiﬁes the relative transmissibility of hospitalized patients
ompared to symptomatic patients in the community. Thus 0 < l < 1
ould represent partially effective hospital isolation measures that
ecrease MERS-CoV transmission probability below that seen in
he community, and l > 1 denotes increased transmission in the
ospital relative to the community, potentially due to biologic
r epidemiologic reasons. We  make the simplifying assumption
hat asymptomatic individuals do not contribute to the transmis-
ion process (Leung et al., 2006; Ksiazek et al., 2003; Lee et al.,
003).
A proportion c,i of latent index cases individuals in Ei progress
o the symptomatic infectious class Ii at the rate  while the
est (1 − c,i) progress to asymptomatic and non-infectious class
i at the same rate . Only the symptomatic cases are observed.
ymptomatic index infectious individuals Ii are hospitalized at the
verage rate a or recover without being hospitalized at the average
ate  I,i Similarly, a fraction c,s of secondary cases in Es progress
o the symptomatic class Is at the rate  while the rest (1 − c,s)
rogress to asymptomatic and non-infectious class As at the same
ate . Symptomatic secondary infectious Is-individuals are hos-
italized at average rate a or recover without being hospitalized
t average rate  I,s. Individuals in the “removed” class do not con-
ribute to the transmission process.artment are removed).
ding estimates of the epidemiological parameters are given in Table 1.
We  ﬁt simulations to three types of observed MERS-CoV epi-
demiological data. First, we use the cumulative number of index
cases reported during the Apr-Oct 2013 study period, which is the
number of cases progressing to the Ii compartment in our model
and follows equation Ci(t) (Text S1). Second, we use the cumula-
tive number of secondary symptomatic community cases, which
is the number of cases progressing to the Is compartment in our
model and follows equations Cs(t). Lastly, we consider the cumu-
lative number of symptomatic secondary cases that are generated
by hospitalized patients, including inpatients, health care workers,
and visitors of hospital patients, which is given by equation CIH(t)
in our model.
Under the ‘surveillance bias’ scenario (A), the proportion of
exposed (latent) individuals progressing to the infectious class
and the proportion of symptomatic cases that are hospitalized
are the same for both index and secondary cases (i.e., c,i = c,s
and  I,i =  I,s). Under the ‘differential transmission’ scenario (B),
all index cases develop symptomatic disease (c,i = 1) and require
hospitalization ( I,i = 0).
MERS-CoV epidemiological parameters
The incubation period (1/k) was ﬁxed at 5.2 days according
to data from a hospital outbreak in Saudi Arabia (Assiri et al.,
2013a), and in line with information from travel-related cases
(Cauchemez et al., 2014). Based on 38 secondary cases with
disease severity information in our dataset, the proportion of
exposed individuals progressing to the symptomatic stage (c,s)
was estimated at 55.3% while the fraction of symptomatic cases
that were hospitalized (h) was estimated at 76.2%. The recov-
ery rate for cases in the community ( I,s) was set at 1/5 days,
which is in line with SARS epidemiology (Lipsitch et al., 2003).
The average time from symptom onset to hospital admission
(a) was estimated based on h = a/(a +  I,s). Baseline parameter
G. Chowell et al. / Epidemics 9 (2014) 40–51 43
Table  1
Epidemiological parameter estimates, ranges, and their sources. Prior distributions, posterior means and corresponding conﬁdence intervals, and the Geweke index are
provided for estimated epidemiological parameters (shaded cells) using the delayed rejection adaptive Metropolis-Hastings (DRAM) algorithm in a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo
(MCMC) framework.
Parameter Scenario Symbol Initial/baseline Range Mean and
95% CI
Average
Geweke index
Source
The average daily rate of new
infections arising from exposure to
environmental/animal source
A  ˛ 0.5 (0, 5) 0.5 (0.36,
0.63)
0.99 Estimated
The  mean human-human transmission
rate per day
A  ˇ 0.2 (0, 2) 0.10 (0.02,
0.21)
0.97 Estimated
Relative transmissibility of
hospitalized cases
A l 1.0 (0, 6) 2.0 (0.57,5.0) 0.98 Estimated
The  average daily rate of new
infections arising from exposure to
environmental/animal source
B  ˛ 0.5 (0, 5) 0.29 (0.22,
0.37)
0.99 Estimated
The  mean human-human transmission
rate per day
B  ˇ 0.2 (0, 2) 0.08 (0.02,
0.17)
0.97 Estimated
Relative transmissibility of
hospitalized cases
B l 1.0 (0, 6) 1.9 (0.60, 5.0) 0.98 Estimated
Mean latent period (days) A, B 1/k 5.2 (3, 8) – – Assiri et al. (2013a),
Lessler et al. (2009) &
SA
Proportion of symptomatic and
infectious cases among index cases
A
B
c,i
c,i
—1
0.585 (0.3,
0.6)
– – Primary data & SA
Proportion of symptomatic and
infectious cases among secondary
cases
A, B c,s〈ˇ〉 0.585 (0.3,
0.6)
– – Primary data & SA
Proportion of hospitalized individuals
among symptomatic and infectious
index cases
A
B
h,i
h,i = 1
0.708 (0.4,
0.8)
– –
Proportion of hospitalized individuals
among symptomatic and infectious
secondary cases
A, B h,s 0.708 (0.4,
0.8)
– – Primary data & SA
Mean  infectious period among primary
cases (days)
A
B
1/ I,I
 I,i = 0
5.0 (3, 7) – – Assiri et al. (2013a),
Donnelly et al. (2003),
Lessler et al. (2009) &
SA
Mean  infectious period among
secondary cases (days)
A, B 1/ I,s 5.0 (3, 7) – – Assiri et al. (2013a),
Donnelly et al. (2003),
Lessler et al. (2009) &
SA
Mean  time from symptom onset to
hospital admission (days)
A, B 1/a a = Ih/(1 − h) – – – SA
S
v
T
T
t
(
q
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e
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R
RMean length of hospital stay (days) A, B 1/r 7.0 
A = Sensitivity analysis.
alues and ranges used for sensitivity analysis are shown in
able 1.
he transmissibility of index and secondary cases, Ri and Rs, and
heir relationship to Roverall
Classically, the basic reproduction number, denoted by R0
Anderson and May, 1991; Diekmann and Heesterbeek, 2000)
uantiﬁes the average number of secondary cases generated by
nfectious individuals in the absence of control interventions in
 completely susceptible population and at the beginning of an
pidemic. In order to compare our results to previous estimates
f the reproduction number for MERS-CoV (Breban et al., 2013;
auchemez et al., 2014), we deﬁne reproduction numbers Ri and Rs,
s the average number of cases generated by a typical index and sec-
ndary case, respectively, and Roverall as the reproduction number
veraged over all the cases. Extension of classic branching process
esults (Harris, 2002; Lange, 2010), provides the following relation-
hip between the 3 transmission parameters (see supporting Text
2 for details):
R
overall = i1 − Rs + Ri
We  note that Ri > 1 does not imply endemic spread the way that
0 > 1 does. Indeed, the epidemic may  die out if Ri > 1 but Rs < 1 and(5,10) – – SA
hence Roverall remains below 1. Further, these parameters integrate
the impact of public health interventions (e.g. contact precautions,
isolation in hospital wards) on transmission.
Under the ‘surveillance bias’ scenario A (c,i = c,s and  I,i =  I,s),
the average transmissibility of index and secondary cases is the
same, following:
Ri = Rs = ˇ
[
c,i
(
1(
a + I,i
)
)
+ l
(
1
r
)(
a(
a + I,i
)
)]
.
where (1/(a +  I,i) is the mean infectious period of community
cases, a/(a +  I,i) is the fraction symptomatic cases that are hospi-
talized, and 1/r is the mean infectious period of hospitalized cases
(see Chowell et al., 2006). This expression can be written as the sum
of the contributions of infectious individuals in the community and
the hospital as follows:
Ri = R comm, i + R hosp, i
Rs = R comm, s + R hosp, s
where R comm,i = R comm,s = ˇ(c,i/(a +  I,i)) and,R hosp, i = R hosp, s =  ˇ l
(
c,i
(
1
r
))(
a(
a + I,i
)
)
.
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Under the ‘differential transmission’ scenario B, the transmissi-
ility of index cases is allowed to differ. Even if the reproduction
umber of index cases was greater than 1 in this scenario, sub-
ritical transmission among secondary cases would still ensure the
ventual extinction of all transmission chains. Under this scenario,
he reproduction number of secondary cases is given by:
s = ˇ
[
c,s
(
1(
a + I,s
) + l( 1
r
)(
a(
a + I,s
)
)]
,
hereas the reproduction number of index cases is given by:
i = ˇ
[
1
a
+ l
r
]
here R comm,i = (ˇ(1/a)) and R hosp,i = (ˇ(l/r)) are the contrib-
tions of community index cases and hospitalized index cases to
ransmission, respectively. Similarly, the contributions of commu-
ity and hospital-based transmission to the reproduction number
f secondary cases are given by:
R comm, s = ˇ
(
c,i(
a + I,i
)
)
and,
R hosp, s =  ˇ l
(
c,i
(
1
r
)(
a(
a + I,i
)
)
.
arameter estimation
Since the date of symptom onset is lacking for a majority of
ases, our main analysis relies on ﬁtting our model to the total
umber of MERS-CoV cases (“outbreak size”) for the study period
pr–Oct 2013. As a sensitivity analysis, we also impute the missing
ates of symptom onset for visualization purposes and to attempt
o trajectory-match the cumulative number of daily cases (Text S1).
We  estimated three parameters (daily rate of zoonotic infec-
ion, ˛; the human-human transmission rate, ˇ; and the relative
ransmissibility of hospitalized cases, l) by ﬁtting our transmission
odel predictions of Ci(t), Cs(t) and CIH(t) to the total observed
umbers of index, secondary and hospital-based secondary cases
t the end of our study period. We  minimized the “sum of square
rrors” between the corresponding model outputs and observed
ase counts for each of the three transmission settings (reser-
oir, community, hospital). We  used a delayed rejection adaptive
etropolis-Hastings (DRAM) algorithm in a Markov-Chain Monte-
arlo (MCMC) framework which has been previously described
n ref. (Haario et al., 2006) (Matlab package available from:
ttp://helios.fmi.ﬁ/∼lainema/mcmc/). We  assumed uniform prior
istributions for ˛,  ˇ and l with broad ranges (Table 1). We  allowed
he algorithm to run for 10,000 iterations with an initial burn-in
f 5000 iterations to allow runs to reach a stationary regime. The
eweke diagnostic method was employed to assess convergence of
hains (Geweke, 1992), with values close to 1 deemed satisfactory.
osterior distributions for each parameter were obtained from the
nderlying joint posterior distribution of resulting Markov chains.
ince our study period starts with a large hospital outbreak, the
utbreak simulation was initialized with one initial spillover case
i.e., Ii(0) = 1) and also included a low number of exposed secondary
ases (i.e. Es(0) = 5). Parameter estimates were not sensitive to these
nitial conditions.Sensitivity analyses were performed by varying parameters
eﬁning the natural history of the disease (Table 1) and by ﬁtting
umulative numbers of daily cases using interpolated onset dates,
nstead of ﬁnal outbreak size data.ics 9 (2014) 40–51
Quantifying stochastic uncertainty in outbreak progression
We  reconstructed the stochastic uncertainty in the outbreak
progression (number of spillover and human-to-human transmis-
sion events) by parametric bootstrapping in order to generate
conservative uncertainty bounds for parameters. Speciﬁcally we
simulated 200 epidemic realizations of our best-ﬁt MERS-CoV
transmission model (Table 1) through a Poisson simulation
approach (Gustafsson and Sternad, 2007). We  then estimated
model parameters for each of the 200 stochastic outbreak real-
izations by the MCMC  approach described above and used the
distribution of estimated parameter values to construct 95% con-
ﬁdence intervals. Parameter convergence for each of the 200 runs
was assessed by the Geweke diagnostic method (Geweke, 1992).
This “hybrid” estimation approach allowed us to accomplish two
goals: (1) estimate conservative parameter uncertainty bounds and
(2) assess identiﬁability of model parameters.
Implications of surveillance bias on previous estimates of
reproduction number
In order to model how previous estimates of Ri and Roverall
(Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014) could be inﬂuenced by
surveillance bias, we  assume that (1 − c,i) of the MERS CoV cases
are asymptomatic, unobserved index cases that do not transmit any
infection. We  then adjust previously reported estimates of Ri and
Roverall (Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014) to incorporate
the negligible transmission of unobserved cases (see supporting
Text S2 for details). In this framework, setting c,i = 1, corresponds
to taking the previous results at face value and is most similar to
our differential transmission model (scenario B). Meanwhile setting
c,i = 0.585 (per Table 1) is similar to our surveillance-bias model
(scenario A). This approach provides a synthesis of existing R esti-
mates derived by different statistical methods and for different
levels of underreporting.
Results
Epidemiological data
The course of the MERS-CoV outbreak in Saudi Arabia from
April-8 to October-31, 2013, can be reconstructed from reported
and imputed dates of symptom onset (Fig. 2). Of the 122 reported
MERS-CoV cases during this period, 58 cases were putatively asso-
ciated with exposure from a yet to be identiﬁed MERS-CoV reservoir
source, and hence considered ‘index cases’. The remaining 64 cases
were epidemiologically linked to an earlier case and hence clas-
siﬁed as secondary cases. Of the 64 secondary cases, 47 were
symptomatic and 17 did not exhibit symptoms. Of the 47 secondary
symptomatic cases, 35 were linked to nosocomial transmission
(hospital-based secondary cases in our terminology).
Model ﬁtting
Convergence of our MERS-CoV transmission model ﬁt was
excellent for both the surveillance bias and differential transmis-
sion scenarios, as indicated by the corresponding Geweke indices
(Table 1). The average daily rate of MERS–CoV spillover events was
estimated at 0.5 (95% CI: 0.36, 0.63) cases a day for the ‘surveillance-
bias’ scenario A. The spillover rate estimate was  somewhat lower
under the ‘differential transmission’ scenario B, with ˛——0.29 (95%
CI: 0.22, 0.37) cases a day. Our estimates for the human-to-human
transmission rate and the relative transmissibility of hospital-
ized cases vs community cases were consistent for both scenarios
(See  ˇ and l values in Table 1). However, our simulation study
revealed a signiﬁcant negative correlation between these parame-
ters (Spearman rho = −0.96, P < 0.001), which precluded a reliable
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Fig. 2. Temporal progression of MERS-CoV symptomatic cases according to exposure history by date of symptom onset, 08-April 2013 to 27-October 2013, Saudi Arabia
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ases.  The red solid line is the mean of the ensemble of curves. The overall percen
ymptomatic cases, and asymptomatic cases to the total number of reported cases 
dentiﬁcation of these two parameters from data. Nevertheless,
e were able to ﬁnd reasonably well-bounded estimates of R as
etailed below.eproduction number estimates
Despite potential correlation between 2 of the estimated param-
ters (  ˇ and l), reproduction numbers were estimated with good
ig. 3. Distributions of the reproduction numbers for index and secondary cases and t
pidemiological scenario. Scenario A: ‘Surveillance bias”. Scenario B: ‘Transmission bias’ ( imputation strategy because the date of symptom onset was not available for all
ontribution of index cases, hospital-based symptomatic cases, community-based
o shown (C).
precision (Fig. 3). Both epidemiological scenarios indicated that
the average transmissibility of secondary MERS-CoV cases remains
below the critical threshold of 1.0 and underscored the importance
of hospital-based transmission, estimated to be over 4-fold higher
than community-based transmission for both index and secondary
cases (Table 2).
Under the ‘surveillance-bias’ scenario A, we  estimated that the
transmission potential of both index and secondary cases was  well
he relative contributions of community and hospitalized cases according to each
see text).
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Table 2
Reproduction number estimates and corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals derived from the uncertainty analysis described in the text for index (spillover) and secondary
cases  and the corresponding contributions of community and hospitalized cases to the reproduction number.
Surveillance bias scenario (Scenario A)
Index cases Secondary cases
Ri R hosp,i R comm,i Rs R hosp,s R comm,s
0.45 (0.29, 0.61) 0.36 (0.24, 0.47) 0.08 (0.02, 0.18) 0.45 (0.29, 0.61) 0.36 (0.24, 0.47) 0.08 (0.02, 0.18)
Differential-transmissibility scenario (Scenario B)
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Ri R hosp,i R comm,i
0.88 (0.58, 1.20) 0.72 (0.51, 0.99) 0.16 (0.04, 0.36) 
elow 1.0, with Ri = Rs = 0.45 (95% CI: 0.29, 0.61). Hospital-based
ransmission was estimated to be a major contributor to the out-
reak, with R hosp,i = R hosp,s = 0.36 (95% CI: 0.24, 0.47), which is
bout 4.5-times higher than the contribution of community-based
ransmission (R comm,i = R comm,s = 0.08 (95% CI: 0.02, 0.18), Table 2).
n other words, the contribution of hospital-based transmission to
he reproduction number (Ri = Rs) was 82.0% (95% CI: 65.8, 94.3)
Fig. 4).
Under the ‘differential-transmissibility’ scenario B, the repro-
uction number of index cases was substantially higher than that
f secondary cases, with Ri = 0.88 (95% CI: 0.58, 1.20), and Rs = 0.36
95% CI: 0.24, 0.51). The contribution of hospital-based transmis-
ion to the reproduction number of index cases was 82.7% (95% CI:
6.3, 94.4). Hospital-based transmission contributed similarly to
he reproduction number of index and secondary cases (Fig. 4).
Based on our model, we estimate that a 20% reduction in the
ransmissibility of hospitalized cases would decrease the total
umber of secondary cases by 27%, and an 80% reduction in hos-
ital transmission would decrease the number of secondary cases
y 72%. By contrast, a 20% and 80% reduction in community trans-
ission would only lead to a 12% and 28% reduction in numbers of
econdary cases, respectively.utbreak simulations and sensitivity analyses
Overall, the extrapolated daily curves of cumulative symp-
omatic cases followed closely the surveillance bias model’s
ig. 4. The percentage contribution of hospital-based transmission to the reproduction
cenarios. Similar hospital-based contributions were obtained for index cases for both epSecondary cases
Rs R hosp,s R comm,s
0.36 (0.24, 0.51) 0.30 (0.21, 0.41) 0.07 (0.02, 0.15)
predicted uncertainty bounds except for the early part of the
study period when a substantial number of secondary cases were
reported, in association with the large hospital outbreak (Fig. 5).
Based on the ‘surveillance bias’ scenario, we estimated that a total of
98 spillover cases (95% CI: 81–119) and 86 secondary cases (95% CI:
42–132) occurred during our study period, so that only 59% of index
cases and 55% of secondary cases were symptomatic cases reported
through active surveillance. These results are in line with the origi-
nal assumption of unbalanced detection probability between index
and secondary cases. For illustration, Fig. 6 shows the predicted
effects of control interventions (targeting community-based or
hospital-based transmission, via parameter l), pathogen adaptation
to humans (i.e, increase in baseline transmission rate, ˇ),  and poten-
tial increases in reservoir spillover rate (via parameter ˛), relative
to the baseline ‘surveillance bias’ scenario A.
Under the ‘surveillance bias’ scenario, average reproduction
number estimates remained well below the epidemic threshold of
R = 1 under various sensitivity analyses for natural history param-
eters (Table 1). Mean estimates of the reproduction number for
index and secondary cases (Ri = Rs) ranged from 0.43 to 0.51 while
the ratio of the contribution of hospital-based to community-based
transmission to the reproduction number ranged from 2.66 to
7.75 in sensitivity analyses. Moreover, the contribution of hospital-
based transmission to the reproduction number ranged from 71.7%
to 82.5%.
Under the ‘differential transmission’ scenario, although repro-
duction number estimates were more dependent on various
 number of secondary cases for the surveillance bias and the transmission bias
idemiological scenarios (not shown).
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Fig. 5. Temporal variation in MERS symptomatic cases associated with index (zoonotic) events and secondary (human-to-human) transmission as predicted from the model
ﬁt  to the data according to epidemiological scenario A (‘Surveillance bias’, top). The mean (red solid line) and 95% uncertainty bounds (gray shading) generated from stochastic
simulation as described in the text are shown. The blue dashed line is the approximate observed progression of symptomatic MERS-CoV cases by date of symptom onset (onset
dates  imputed as in Fig. 2). The overall percentage contribution of index cases, hospital-based symptomatic cases, community-based symptomatic cases, and asymptomatic
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ssumptions about the natural history of disease, endemic trans-
ission remained improbable since Rs was consistently less than
ne and ranged from 0.21 to 0.43. In contrast, the reproduction
umber of index cases Ri ranged from 0.72 to 2.46. For index cases
he ratio of the contribution of hospital-based to community-based
ransmission to the reproduction number ranged from 2.4 to 4.4
hile the percentage contribution of hospital-based transmission
anged from 69.4% to 84.0%. A similar contribution of hospital-
ased transmission to the reproduction number of secondary cases
as obtained. Geweke convergence statistics showed excellent
onvergence for all estimated parameters in sensitivity analyses
average >0.95).
ynthesis of estimates of MERS-CoV transmission potential, 2013
utbreak
Our results provide perspective on two previous studies that
ave quantiﬁed the transmission potential of MERS-CoV (Breban
t al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014) (Fig. 7). Breban et al. (2013) use
n inference method that assumes the transmission of index cases
s similar to the transmission of secondary cases to produce two
stimates of Roverall. Two separate estimates for Roverall (0.60 and
.69) are reported based on whether ambiguously classiﬁed cases
re favored to be primary or secondary cases. When these estimates
re combined, the 95% conﬁdence interval for these reproduction
umbers spans 0.42–0.92. In their model, the inferred value for Ri
s also 0.42–0.92, because no distinction between Ri and Roverall is
ade.
Cauchemez et al. (2014) use a similar method, but more data, to
roduce a 95% conﬁdence interval of 0.47–0.85 for Roverall. However,hown (bottom). The radius of the pie chart for scenario B (‘transmission bias’) was
r interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred
they also utilize an additional technique that incorporates data on
the speciﬁc timing of cases (but assumes perfect observation of
cases) to infer two  separate 95% conﬁdence intervals for Ri that span
0.67–1.50. Based on the approach of taking the observed data at
face-value these prior results are best compared to our differential
transmission scenario.
We  can also adjust these prior results based on the assump-
tion that asymptomatic index cases occur in the same proportion
as in our surveillance bias scenario, but they escape surveillance.
The adjusted 95% conﬁdence intervals for Breban et al.’s model are
0.25–0.54 for Ri and 0.30–0.87 for Roverall. The adjusted 95% conﬁ-
dence intervals for Cauchemez et al.’s model are 0.39–0.88 for Ri
and 0.34–0.77 for Roverall. These adjusted values are best compared
to our surveillance bias results.
Key trends emerge from comparing reproduction number esti-
mates across studies (Fig. 7). First, although some of the models
include the possibility that Ri > 1, none of them suggest that
Roverall > 1. This argues against the possibility that MERS-CoV is
self-sustaining in humans. Rather, continual introduction from a
non-human reservoir is needed for persistence. However, because
some models predict Ri > 1, it is unclear whether the lack of endemic
spread is due to effective control interventions or intrinsically
weak human-to-human transmissibility. Second, when observa-
tion bias is incorporated into parameter estimation, the range of
possible values for both Ri and Roverall shift to smaller values. This
may  appear counter-intuitive because the existence of unobserved
cases might suggest that transmission was under-estimated pre-
viously. This apparent paradox is a result of our assumption that
asymptomatic index cases (rather than secondary cases) are the
least likely to be observed.
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Fig. 6. The effect of control interventions relatively to ‘surveillance bias’ scenario A (targeting hospital or community-based transmission) as well as the effect of potential
pathogen adaptation to humans (increase in baseline transmission rate), and geographic spread with potential increases in reservoir spillover rate (via parameter alpha)
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iscussion
We  have used dynamic epidemic modeling and branching pro-
esses to analyze epidemiological data on the progression of the
ERS-CoV outbreak in Apr-Oct 2013 in Saudi Arabia (Cotten et al.,
013; Cauchemez et al., 2014; Assiri et al., 2013a,b; Penttinen et al.,
013; WHO  MERS, 2013; Tefanie Gierer et al., 2013). Our analysis
as focused on resolving uncertainty surrounding the transmissi-
ility of MERS-CoV in its early dissemination phase, and quantifying
he speciﬁc contributions of index, secondary, community and hos-
italized cases, as well as surveillance bias, to the overall level
f transmission. In the process we have provided perspective on
he broad ranges of reproduction number estimates presented in
wo recent studies of the MERS-CoV outbreak (Breban et al., 2013;
auchemez et al., 2014). All of the models consistently suggest
hat human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV remained sub-
ritical in 2013, arguing against the possibility that the outbreak
as self-sustaining in humans. However, some models predict that
he reproduction number of zoonotic cases may  be higher than 1,
hich may  support the effectiveness of control measures applied
mong contacts of identiﬁed cases, and could signal a potential
cceleration of the epidemic if these measures were to be relaxed.
Prior studies of MERS-CoV have acknowledged that surveil-
ance bias can complicate the inference of transmission parameters
Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014). However, rather than
ccepting the possibility of surveillance bias as a limitation of our
tudy, our analysis has explicitly incorporated its potential impact,ses, hospital-based symptomatic cases, community-based symptomatic cases, and
ario are shown. The radiuses of the pie charts were scaled proportionally according
while also considering an alternative ‘transmission bias’ scenario
where observations are taken at face value. When we  incorpo-
rate the possibility that less severe index cases are unobserved, the
range of possible reproduction numbers in our study and previously
published models (Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al., 2014)
shifts to smaller values (Fig. 7). Since convergence of our model to
data is high in both the ‘surveillance bias’ scenario and ‘differential
transmission’ scenarios, further information is needed to tease out
the extent to which observation bias operated in 2013 and beyond.
For example, targeted serological studies in communities where
index cases have been reported could shed light on the fraction of
index cases that may  be unobserved. Further, it would be helpful to
know more about the MERS-CoV surveillance process in Saudi Ara-
bia, and determine whether individual cases were detected because
they self-reported to a health center or were actively discovered
via contact tracing of a severe case. More information on standards
of clinical practice would also be helpful, such as the probability
that a patient who  presents with milder symptoms to a health care
facility would be diagnosed with MERS-CoV. Ancillary data from
laboratories would also be helpful such as the overall number of
samples that were tested for MERS-CoV and their spatio-temporal
distribution.
A particular concern for the epidemic potential of MERS-CoV
is that the virus shares features of the related coronavirus that
caused outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in
2003, spanning several countries and continents (Ksiazek et al.,
2003). Both MERS-CoV and SARS viruses can invade the lower
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Fig. 7. Synthesizing available estimates for the reproduction number of MERS CoV.
The  95% conﬁdence intervals for the reproduction number averaged over all cases
(Roverall) and averaged over index cases (Ri) are shown. Besides the two  transmission
scenarios considered in this study (black and gray dots), the plot includes results of
Breban et al. (2013) and Cauchemez et al. (2014). The key distinction among the
models are that Breban et al. (2013) modeled primary and secondary transmission
as  being similar; Cauchemez et al. (2014) used the timing of cases to estimate Ri; our
differential transmission model accounts for the higher observed disease severity of
index cases; and our surveillance bias model considers the possibility that all weakly
transmitting and asymptomatic index cases are unobserved. A modiﬁed version of
Breban et al. and Cauchemez et al. are also shown in the plot that compensate for
the  possibility of unobserved index cases and thus allow direct comparison to our
surveillance bias model. Cauchemez et al.’s results are presented as a conﬁdence
region because their inference of Roverall was  separate from their inference of Ri . All
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spillover transmission dynamics. Although our model assumeshe  other models contain an intrinsic dependence between Roverall and Ri and so
hese results are presented as a curve.
espiratory tract and cause severe pneumonia (de Wit  et al., 2013;
ranks et al., 2003). Both infections are considered severe, espe-
ially among older adults with underlying medical conditions
Assiri et al., 2013b; Donnelly et al., 2003). Our ﬁndings indicate that
he transmissibility MERS-CoV in secondary cases remained well
elow the epidemic threshold in Saudi Arabia in 2013, ensuring
hat all human-to-human transmission chains go extinct (Ferguson
t al., 2004). At the time of this writing, there was  not enough
esolution in MERS-CoV phylogenetic data to assess whether trans-
ission was only endemic in the animal reservoir or could persist
n humans (Cauchemez et al., 2014). Based on our synthesis of
pidemiological data and existing models, we argue that the trans-
ission potential of MERS-CoV is currently low based on the
rogression of the 2013 outbreak, and on the same order as that
f other stage III viral zoonoses such as inﬂuenza A/H5N1, mon-
eypox or Nipah virus, although much higher than that of inﬂuenza
/H7N9 (Blumberg and Lloyd-Smith, 2013a,b; Chowell et al., 2013).
n contrast, the reproduction number for SARS was  estimated to be
2–3 during the pre-intervention period (Riley et al., 2003; Lipsitch
t al., 2003). Although our study cannot speak to the dynamics
f the recent resurgence of cases in Spring 2014, it is reassuring
hat disease transmission remained limited to the Arabian Penin-
ula throughout June 2014. Indeed, chains of transmission initiated
y infected travelers returning to Europe, Africa, Asia and North
merica have remained extremely short (Cauchemez et al., 2014).
Despite these reassuring ﬁndings of weak secondary transmis-
ion based on 2013 MERS-CoV cases, we cannot rule out that
ransmissibility of index cases Ri, was substantially higher, with
 95% CI ranging from 0.6 to 1.2 (‘transmission bias’ scenario). If
i happened to be greater than one, it is then essential to under-
tand why Rs was less than one. One possibility is that control
nterventions around identiﬁed secondary cases were particularlyics 9 (2014) 40–51 49
effective in 2013. If this were the case, it is imperative to identify
which of these interventions were most effective so that they can
be rapidly implemented in the event that MERS-CoV spreads to a
new geographic region. A similar situation arose in the last days
of smallpox eradication, as stringent control measures were put in
place once cases were identiﬁed, limiting the transmission of sec-
ondary cases (Fenner et al., 1988). Alternatively, it may  be that there
is an intrinsically biological phenomenon in which humans infected
by a zoonotic reservoir experience more clinically severe disease,
and in turn a higher transmission potential than those infected by
humans. In this case, further adaptation of MERS-CoV to humans
would be required for sustainable transmission to occur. A deﬁnite
identiﬁcation of the reservoir for MERS-CoV would help to shed
light on potential variation in doses and route of exposure between
index and secondary cases, which may  account for the observed
differences in onward transmission.
Because any increase in Rs leads to a greater than linear increase
in size of transmission chains (Blumberg and Lloyd-Smith, 2013a),
and the rate of MERS-CoV reports appears to increase (Cauchemez
et al., 2014), there is strong motivation to ascertain the poten-
tial impact of control interventions. A key ﬁnding of our analysis
was that the number of MERS-CoV cases caused by hospital-based
transmission was  4.3 to 4.6-fold higher than community-based
transmission and estimates were robust to a variety of sensitiv-
ity analysis. These ﬁndings are reminiscent of SARS (Varia et al.,
2003; Lau et al., 2004; Tambyah et al., 2003) and indicate that
more stringent hospital control measures would be particularly
effecting at reducing transmission. The reasons for increased hos-
pital transmission could include increased intensity and duration
of viral shedding, or increased contacts with particularly vulnera-
ble patients (Seto et al., 2003; Chowell et al., 2004). Understanding
the MERS-CoV transmission process in the hospital is particularly
important in light of recent reports of widespread infection among
camels in North Africa (Chu et al., 2014), where low-resources
could make surveillance and hospital control measures far harder
to implement.
Our study is prone to limitations, as we  made important sim-
plifying assumptions to safeguard tractable inference. First, we
assumed that the rate of zoonotic introductions into the human
populations was constant. This assumption may  be reasonable if
MERS-CoV prevalence level in the zoonotic reservoir has reached
an endemic state and the rate of animal-to-human contacts was  sta-
ble throughout our study period. Similarly, we have not attempted
to quantify changes in the baseline transmission rate or the rel-
ative transmissibility of hospitalized cases over time, but we ﬁt
our model solely to cases that occurred when pro-active surveil-
lance was  implemented in Saudi Arabia (Memish et al., 2014).
Further, we assume that asymptomatic cases do not transmit infec-
tion. However, given that MERS-CoV secondary cases have typically
been traceable to an index case it seems unlikely that there can
be much asymptomatic transmission as this would lead to difﬁ-
culty in reconstructing transmission chains. Another limitation of
our model is that parameters  ˇ and l were not uniquely identiﬁed,
although we  were able to ﬁnd reasonably well-bounded estimates
of R. This is not entirely surprising, as a similar phenomenon occurs
when a simple SIR model is ﬁtted to the early exponential phase
of an epidemic. In such a simple model, both  ˇ (the transmission
rate) and  (the recovery rate) are not identiﬁable. Yet, the ratio
beta/gamma = R0 is often identiﬁable in practice.
More elaborate models either based on dynamic systems or
branching processes could be developed for MERS-CoV to incor-
porate more realistic mixing structures and possibly reﬁne thehomogeneous mixing within community and hospital popula-
tions, our results did not warrant further model heterogeneity
given limited available data. As more data become available, these
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ssumptions could be reﬁned particularly if the pathogen’s intrin-
ic transmissibility increases or if the virus spreads to poor areas
here nosocomial transmission may  be ampliﬁed. An important
ssue in modeling outbreaks in the Arabian Peninsula is the lack of
nformation on age- and gender-speciﬁc contact rate patterns, as it
as been done for European countries (Lee et al., 2003). Finally, we
id not consider the progression of more recent cases of MERS-CoV
eported after October 2013, to maintain comparability with pre-
ious transmission studies (Breban et al., 2013; Cauchemez et al.,
014).
In conclusion, modeling of available MERS-CoV case data
eported during Apr–Oct 2013 in Saudi Arabia found robust sup-
ort for the lack of persistence of the infection in humans without
ontinued reintroduction from the reservoir. However, as with
ll emerging zoonoses, the potential for viral adaptation towards
ncreased transmissibility is a real threat that needs careful moni-
oring. We  have highlighted how observation bias (particularly the
ifﬁculty in observing asymptomatic and less severe index cases)
an skew the inference and interpretation of transmission parame-
ers. In particular, more data on the surveillance process is needed
o that the transmission potential of index cases can be more rig-
rously ascertained both retrospectively and in the on-going 2014
utbreak. The relative transmissibility of primary and secondary
ases has important implications for the efﬁcacy of current con-
rol measures and the potential for spread in other regions that are
ore resource-limited. As a focal point of control, we have found
hat over 80% of transmission events are likely occurring in a hos-
ital setting. We  hope that future surveillance efforts can elucidate
peciﬁc mechanisms of hospital-based transmission and effective
ontrol so that targeted interventions can be rapidly implemented
f MERS-CoV spreads globally or adapts to humans.
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